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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION AGAINST PSYCHIATRIC
POLITICAL ABUSES
George J. Alexander*

I.

INTRODUCTION

While some instances of alleged psychiatric abuse have
been litigated, much more remains untested in international
tribunals. It is even fair to say that issues of human rights
violations through psychiatric interventions only elicited
sparse domestic jurisprudence until quite recently. 1 That is
not to say that there are not announced principles which appear to protect against abuse. Such rules exist both nationally and internationally. They are, however, undermined by
exceptions designed to permit medical treatment for those
deemed to require it. Unfortunately, those who invoke the
mental health system, however cynically, usually begin by
claiming therapeutic aims. Secondly, madness, however described, can be used as a claim for relief from legal responsibility, as in the insanity defense, or in claims of legal incompetence. This facet of mental health law is customarily
invoked by persons claiming that it dulls the impact of the
law on some of the weak. Ironically, it is equally useful to
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale; Professor of Law
and former Dean, Director of the Institute of International and Comparative

Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. The author thanks his former Research Assistant, Susan Mayer, for her help in the preparation of the lectures

at the Human Rights Institute in Strasbourg on which this article is based.
Several Research Assistants, notably Evi Barth and Leonid Zilberman, have
helped to update them and to convert them to this article.
1. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993); Zinormon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Allen v. Illinois, 478

U.S. 364 (1986); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1981); Parnham v. J.R, 442

U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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others who punish or disadvantage people by labeling them
mentally ill.
The dearth of effective opposition to abusive psychiatry is
not, in my view, the product of its lack of impropriety.
Rather, it mirrors the fact that psychiatric treatment appears
to be viewed as part of an admirable scheme to assist patients
in need of help. At a minimum, it is caught up in the society's
general admiration for things scientific. Consequently, those
most active in promoting civil rights in other contexts can
often be reduced to ambivalence between what they perceive
as the virtues of human freedom and humanitarian welfare. 2
Mental health law remains unique in leaving advocates in
doubt as to whether to adopt an adversary position on behalf
of those they represent or, instead, to join with those seeking
to force what is described as help on unwilling patients.
While advocates are in doubt, what can one expect of tribunals and standards writers? This article will discuss the
United Nations' Principles governing this area and cases
brought in international tribunals as contrasted to well established principles from analogous invasions of personal
freedoms in quest of a determination of their legality under
international human rights law.
II.

THE POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY OF PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE

There are instances of psychiatric intervention which, it
may be assumed, almost everyone would repudiate. They
provide a useful platform because there are aspects of commonality which emerge best when there is no dispute concerning benefit to the "patient." In 1931, psychiatrists meeting in Bavaria, Germany decried the traditional expressed
compassion of the nineteenth century and proposed a more
severe response to chronic mental illness. They proposed
sterilization and euthanasia.' By 1936 the eradication of the
unfit was well enough accepted to merit incidental mention in
an official German Medical Journal. 4 When Hitler institutionalized the idea, he required all state institutions to report
2. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, et al., The Trauma of a Due Process Hearing
in the Administrationof PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein Arizona, 13
ARiz. L. REV. 1, 69 (1971).

3. Alexander, Medical Science under Dictatorship, 2 NEW ENG. J. MED.
241 (1949).
4. See id.
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patients who had been ill for five or more years and who were
unable to work. They were required to fill out questionnaires
giving the name, race, marital status, nationality, next of kin,
whether regularly visited and by whom, who bore the financial responsibility and so forth. The decision regarding which
patients should be killed was made entirely by expert consultants, most of whom were professors of psychiatry in key universities. These consultants never saw the patients themselves. The thoroughness of their scrutiny can be appraised
by the work of one expert, who between November 14 and
5
December 1, 1940, evaluated 2109 questionnaires.
These questionnaires were collected by a "Realm's Work
6
Committee of Institutions for Cure and Care." A parallel organization devoted exclusively to the killing of children was
known by the similarly euphemistic name "Realm's Committee for Scientific Approach to Severe Illness Due to Heredity
and Constitution." The "Charitable Transport Company for
the Sick" transported patients to the killing centers and the
"Charitable Foundation for Institutional Care" was in charge
of collecting the costs of the killings from the relatives without, however, informing them of how the charges were to be
used; in the death certificates, the cause of death was
falsified.7
Fortunately, psychiatric genocide seems to have been defeated with its military proponents. It is raised here principally to demonstrate the utility of medical coloration to
achieve political ends. In the beginning, it was useful to the
Nazis to describe incarceration as cure and care and killing
as charity. Only later was broader genocide possible more
openly. That utility has not escaped some governments
which also use coercive psychiatry to achieve political ends.
The World Psychiatric Association has recognized the
possibility of psychiatric political abuse. At its 1977 Congress
in Honolulu, it created a standing committee entitled Com5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. In describing the group murdered by this process, the authorities
claimed that only the most severely regressed mental patients were slaughtered. Id. The authorities developed a ruse to get victims into the gas chambers. Id. They were given bars of soap and told to stand under "showers" which
then released poisoned gas. Id. Despite the claimed disorientation of the
mental patient group, they marched into the showers, deposited their towels
and took their soap for their supposed showers. Id.
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mittee to Investigate Abuses of Psychiatry. In 1983 the Soviet Union withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association

because of its complaint that it was being discredited by
Western influences.8 While it has never openly confessed to
the practices which are described herein, it is interesting to
note that several changes in law have recently been reported
which seem to validate the concerns. In early 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted a rule which permits
relatives of persons improperly committed to mental institutions to appeal the "medical" decisions made in their cases in
court. 9 It also makes it criminal to commit a mentally
healthy person. 10 It was also reported in early 1988 that control of special psychiatric hospitals was shifted from the police to the Health Ministry. 1 '
Prior to glasnost it was difficult to verify reports concerning the Soviet Union. Block and Reddaway 1 2 have written a
horrifying account of prior Russian practice which is supported by other evidence.' 3 They describe the imprisonment
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXV, No. 13, at 1-3.
What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1988, at Al.
Id.
What's News, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at Al.
S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE: THE

SHADOW

OVER WORLD PSYCHIATRY (1984).

13. See, e.g., PoliticalAbuse of Psychiatry in the U.S.S.R., Amnesty International Al Index, EUR 46/01/83 (1983) (an Amnesty International Briefing). The
anecdotes are numerous. One concerns an Amnesty International prisoner of
conscience, Nizametdin Akhmetov. He was imprisoned in 1960 for anti-Soviet
propaganda and agitation. He later was convicted for writing on his cell wall to
protest conditions in the labor camp to which he was sentenced. In 1982, while
he was still serving the sentences for his prior convictions, he was convicted of
circulating "anti-Soviet slander" in a letter he wrote and sent to a psychiatric
institution for an indefinite period. While in the psychiatric institution he
wrote to a friend:
I am in a very bad way my friend. I fear that you may read my letter
like a letter from a madhouse (from where else you will shrug) .... I
am in a very bad way my friend. Never have I suffered so much, never
was my situation so hopeless. I have dropped out of society, from the
scope of its laws, I am absolutely without rights, depersonalized, indeed dehumanized .... There is only one way to escape all this torment (except the torments of conscience), only one way of crawling out
of here - that is to betray myself and get out, but no longer as
Nizametdin Akhmetov. This way is prohibited for me, but that means
that they will grind Nizametdin Akhmetov to nothingness on the millstone of 'state security.'
Of course, I am not ill. Yet I am in an institution which has all the
means of making me ill. This is no exaggeration: Psychiatry has now
reached the limits reached by physics when it split the uranium nu-
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of dissidents in mental institutions as confinement of choice.
It is said to provide three major advantages. First, it avoids
the procedural safeguards associated with criminal prosecution. Second, and more importantly, while a political prisoner may aid his cause by being a martyr; a mental patient
and his cause are discredited by his perceived lunacy. Finally, there is no finite period for such confinement as opposed to criminal sentences which have a definite maximum
term. 14
The conditions described in many Soviet institutions
were savage. In the Soviet Union, for example, psychotherapy was not available but patients were treated with insulin
shock and electroconvulsive therapy as well as tranquilizers.
Punishment was administered by the injection of painful sulfur compounds. 15 Romania is said to have used similar practices. 16 It apparently mixed psychiatric confinement with
physical torture and drugging. For example, it is said to have
used injections of boiled milk and iodine 17which, in addition to
intense pain also caused acute anxiety.
The claim that the use of psychiatry to imprison people
for political reasons is a cardinal violation of international
human rights will surprise no one. 18 That subject will not be
addressed in detail here because the cynical use of psychiatcleus. It is not just the one man with the white coat over his MVD
uniform whom I have to face - he has the entire State behind him.
There is no doubt I am being ground to pieces. It is horrible - the unbearable continuous torment, this so called 'treatment' ....
Unfortunately, I shall not see the day when my Motherland herself judges me ....
The worst thing that can happen to a person may happen to me.
In any case, whether I die or whether they drive me mad - that will be
the end. The end of a human being. Even if it does not happen in a
human way, as with human beings, it will happen to a human being that's what I wanted to stress. And I would like to be spoken of, and to
be remembered, as a human being.
Appeal from a Prisonerof Conscience in a Soviet PsychiatricHospital,Amnesty
International AI Index, EUR 46/50/86 (1986) at 2-4 [hereinafter Prisoner of
Conscience].
14. Prisonerof Conscience, supra note 13 at 2-4.
15. Id.
16. Romania: PsychiatricRepression of Dissent, Amnesty International AI
Index, EUR 39/07/78 (1978).
17. Id.
18. InternationalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A[III], U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Declarationof Human
Rights].
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ric institutions to imprison dissidents has so much in common with other forms of improper imprisonment. Torturing
psychiatric patients with painful chemical or electrical "treatments" also overlaps other forms of torture 19 and so its discussion can be truncated as well.
However, it is important to recognize that the unique
role of psychiatry in discrediting opinion and dehumanizing
those with whom one disagrees is not limited to totalitarian
regimes. Indeed, it may be more dangerous in countries in
which individual rights are generally protected. If people can
transform their opponents from heroes or even martyrs to
lunatics in the public's view, they have accomplished a great
deal. In that sense, psychiatric incarceration may occasion a
greater intrusion of the rights of the politically unpopular
than mere jailing. The disagreement among physicians as to
diagnosis, prognosis and even common terminology 20 as well

19. Id. at art. 5.
20. In one of the few systematic studies of diagnostic reliability, Ash compared diagnoses made by three psychiatrists on the same patients at a government clinic. The patients were examined by psychiatrists jointly, but the diagnoses were recorded independently. The three agreed on the specific diagnostic
category in only 20% of the cases. When only a general diagnostic category was
considered, agreement was higher. All three psychiatrists agreed in 46% of the
cases; two psychiatrists agreed in another 51% of the cases; in only 3% of the
cases did all three disagree. Ash made another rather sobering finding: In fully
one-third of the cases, one psychiatrist found serious pathology, while the other
two found the patient to be, with some qualifications, a normal individual.
Moreover, the joint examinations may have inflated the levels of agreement by
allowing tacit communication among psychiatrists.
The findings of later researchers have generally been consistent with Ash's
findings. In general, researchers have found that the level of reliability, as
measured by inter-psychiatrist agreement on specific diagnostic categories, is
quite low, typically in the neighborhood of 32%.
See Ralph Reisner & Herbert Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look
at the Proposed Federal CriminalCode Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 773, 776 (1974).
Traditionally, psychiatrists have developed descriptive diagnostic labels
which they use in categorizing and dealing with patients. Although most psychiatrists use these designations, they do not agree on their nature, significance
or utility. Some psychiatrists maintain that the labels denote different disease
conditions; others maintain that they apply to reaction patterns having manifest similarities and in no way describe disease conditions. The opinions of
most psychiatrists probably fall somewhere between the two; they accept some
of the diagnostic categories as disease categories, and they view others as convenient ways of grouping reaction patterns. DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH
AND SOCIAL POLICY 13 (1969).
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as pressures to over-predict mental illness 2 1 makes assertion
of mental illness relatively easy, especially for those who also
control the mental institutions. In addition, since psychiatric
intervention is described as medical treatment, it is not in the
class of activities for which strict procedural impediments are
routinely established. Were criminal punishment proposed
instead, one would expect barriers to guard against the inadvertent identification of the innocent. Treatment suggests benevolent conduct and the absence of need to guard against its
imposition. When procedures exist, they tend to be considerably more lax than their criminal counterpart. This is true in
domestic cases and all the more true when the issue is raised
in an international complaint.
The conjunction of the effect of stigmatization, disagreement as to what, if anything, constitutes mental illness and
the laxness of procedural protections make the use of psychiatry effective as a tool of political oppression. In the West,
some problems relating to the use of psychiatry by those who
intentionally pervert the process for their national political
purposes exist. An infinitely larger group is affected by psychiatric manipulation in the interest of individual
aggrandizement.
Several United States cases will be used to illustrate the
point for the following reasons: First, the cases arise in the
legal system with which the author is personally most familiar; secondly, the United States is generally recognized as a
country with a passion for the protection of individual autonomy (it is also correctly seen as a country in which private
litigation in aid of law is very highly developed); third, there
appears little indication that the country has a national policy respecting the perversion of psychiatric institutions for
political ends. Mental institutions are creatures of state and
local governments and they, as well, seem not to have an organized arrangement for the use of hospitals to silence dissent. The use of domestic cases is not intended to assert that
problems in the United States are worse than in other countries. Instead, America serves simply as an example of the
problems that exist everywhere.

21. Bernard L. Diamond, The PsychiatricPrediction of Dangerousness, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974).
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One of the most famous cases was that of Ezra Pound.22
Ezra Pound was indicted for treason against the United
States for his activities in Rome during the Second World
War. He made radio broadcasts in which he denounced the
British and the Jews and expressed hope for an Axis victory.23 After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Pound
and his wife attempted to return to the United States but
permission to enter was denied. Since he could not re-enter
the United States, he stayed in Rome and continued his treasonous radio broadcasts for the Italian government. When
the Allies invaded Italy, Pound was arrested for treason and
returned to Washington.24
Pound never admitted that the broadcasts were treasonous; he claimed that they were patriotic because they called
for an end to the war. Rather than actually try Pound for
treason, the United States government and Pound's defense
attorney decided that it would be better to declare Pound unfit to stand trial and commit him to a mental institution.
Consequently, psychiatric evidence was introduced by the
Government to show his unfitness for trial. The Government's witnesses found that Pound suffered from paranoia.
However,
[n]o evidence was introduced to prove that, in spite of his
peculiarities, Pound could not be treated as a responsible
defendant. Instead, unproved allegations were insinuated, such as his being 'less and less able to order his life.'
This psychiatric accusation was simply untrue. Before
the American troops landed in Italy, Pound was able to
order his life well enough to stay out of the hands of psychiatrists. Whereas, since the end of the European War
he had
been a prisoner, his life having been 'ordered' for
25
him.

After the introduction of the psychiatric testimony, the
trial judge instructed the jury in a manner that allowed them
to find Pound unfit to stand trial in only three minutes.26 He
was committed to St. Elizabeth Hospital where he remained
for thirteen years, from 1945 to 1958. In 1958, a motion was
22. JONAS B. ROBITSCHER,
23. Id. at 106.
24. Id.
25. THoMAs S. SzASz,

LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY

SZASz, LAW AND LIBERTY].

26. Id. at 202-03.

THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY

105-06 (1980).

202 (1963) [hereinafter
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filed in the District of Colombia Circuit asking that the indictment for treason be dismissed. The original psychiatrist
testified saying that although Pound was incurably insane,
he was not dangerous and it would be safe to release him into
his wife's care. The petition was also supported by many of
Pound's friends who were famous poets and writers including
Robert Frost, Ernest Hemingway, and T.S. Eliot. On April
18, 1958, with the consent of the government, the indictment
against Pound was dismissed by Judge Laws.27 Pound, in effect, had the last word.28
Although the efforts were more informal, the Nixon administration also made use of psychiatric labeling to discredit
its enemies. After Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers, the White House authorized a break-in at the office of
his psychiatrist in an unsuccessful effort to find incriminating
psychiatric evidence to use against him.29 During the same
period, Martha Mitchell, the wife of the soon to be convicted
Attorney General, was kept from revealing information about
the Watergate break-in by a combination of physical restraint
and informing the press that she was mentally unbalanced.3 0
There was also the case of General Walker.3 1 During the

federal attempt to integrate the University of Mississippi by
physically supporting the enrollment of James Meredith, an
African American student, former Major General Edwin A.
Walker was arrested, charged with crimes, and then held for
psychiatric examination.3 2 As Dr. Szasz has noted,
"[w]ithout a doubt, this is the most widely publicized case
ever reported in the American press of an attempt to deny an
accused person the right to trial by branding him insane and
33
hence incompetent to stand trial."

To support the government's claim that Walker was too
sick to stand trial, the government furnished an affidavit
27. Id. at 203. Judge Laws was the judge who had originally presided at
the competency hearing.
28. "It has been your habit for long to do away with good writers, You either
drive them mad, or else you blink at their suicides, Or else you condone their
drugs, and talk of insanity and genius, But I will not go mad to please you."
[sic] Id. at 199 (quoting Pound).
29. ROBITSCHER, supra note 22, at 340.
30. Id. at 341-43.
31. The facts about this case are taken from THOMAS SZASZ, SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 178 (1965) [hereinafter SzASz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE].
32. Id.
33. Id.
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from a psychiatrist who had never met Walker but who had
been given government collected descriptions of Walker's behavior.3 4 The doctor's affidavit concluded: "Some of his [Gen.
Walker's] reported behavior reflects sensitivity and essentially unpredictable and seemingly bizarre outbursts of the
type often observed in individuals suffering with paranoid
mental disorder. There are also indications in his medical
history of functional and psychosomatic disorders which
could be precursors of the more serious disorder which his
present behavior suggests. '3 5 Another psychiatrist then re-

viewed the first affidavit and the government's evidence and
concurred without seeing Walker. Walker was committed. 6
Walker's attorney characterized the commitment order
as "simply fantastic" in light of the fact that he had just
talked to him over a two-day period and found him "in complete possession of all mental faculties."37 Three days after
Walker's arrest, his attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus.
The district judge issued an order to show cause to the government. Rather than produce evidence of the reasonableness of Walker's confinement, the government released him
on $50,000 bond. However, he was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. In the subsequent examination, Walker
was found competent to stand trial. At the hearing the government produced still another psychiatrist who had never
seen Walker to testify to his incompetence.3
During this period, the media had already started reporting that Walker was crazy. Walker sued for libel and won a
judgment against the media defendants. After he was found
competent to stand trial, it had yet to be determined whether
there was sufficient evidence to indict him on riot charges.
On January 21, 1963, the Grand Jury failed to indict him.39
The government's plan to convert the matter from the
apparently weak criminal case to a psychiatric one failed but
the illustration is a useful demonstration of how even democratic governments can use psychiatry to achieve their ends.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
SzAsz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 182.
Id.
Id.
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The major intrusion of psychiatry on human values is yet
another troubling facet of its uses. As one author has put it:
For three hundred years, psychiatry has had a role in controlling deviant behavior. Eccentrics, "originals," vagrants, and homeless wanderers who caused little harm
but were irritating to the society they lived in were, and
sometimes still are, hospitalized or deprived of legal
rights. Some critics of psychiatry see this as a political
and see psychiatry as promoting
use of psychiatry
40
conformity.
Another author described the danger of psychiatric abuse as
follows:
Lacking the integrity of a scientific definition, the concept
of mental health-and its antonym, mental illness-has
succumbed to what Bertrand Russell (1953) called the cult
of common usage. In contemporary America it has come
to mean conformity to the demands of society. According
to the common- sense definition, mental health is the ability to play the game of social living, and to play it well.
Conversely, mental illness is the refusal to play, or the inability to play well. 4 '
The cases that demonstrate the broader concern just expressed are numerous.4 2 More frightening is the knowledge
that very few instances of psychiatric abuse lead to reported
appellate cases. The following cases will illustrate this point,
both of which depict how the changing role of women generated a good deal of psychiatric intervention.
Elizabeth Packard (1816-1890) 4 1 was a strong believer in
Christianity. She believed that people are born good and
taught others this philosophy. Her husband, a minister, did
not care for her philosophy because it was contrary to his. He
forbade her from expressing her contrary opinions. She refused to obey him.
"In 1860 Elizabeth Packard's husband psychiatrically
imprisoned her because she dared to engage in 'free religious
40. ROBITSCHER, supra note 22, at 326-27.
41. SzAsz, LAW AND LIBERTY, supra note 25, at 205.
42. See generally SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 31; THOMAs S.
SZASZ, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1987); GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING WILL: USING A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, Ch. 1
(1988) [hereinafter LIVING WILL].
43. This case study is based on the information found in PHYLLIS CHESLER,
WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972).
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inquiry"'. 44 He kidnapped her and committed her to an asylum in Jacksonville, Illinois. He refused to allow their children to see her and deprived her of her personal belongings.
Mrs. Packard kept a diary during her time in the asylum,
which she published following her escape after three years of
confinement. Subsequent to her release, she fought for the
legal rights of mental patients.45
Zelda Fitzgerald (1900-1948) was the wife of renowned
writer F. Scott Fitzgerald.4 6 Fitzgerald disapproved of his
wife's devotion to the arts, and felt that she was too self-absorbed. Fitzgerald was also apparently threatened by his
wife's aspiration to write. He was very upset when she published her own autobiography before Scott had published a
story about Zelda's life and psychiatric confinement. He forbade her to continue writing because her role was to be wife
and mother. To this, Zelda rebelled.
She wants to be a "creative artist": she wants "work."
Only if she does "good work" can she defend herself
against Scott's slighting comments. She . . . is tired of

being forced into accepting Scott's opinions and decisions
about everything. In fact, she would not do so, she would
has
rather be hospitalized. She feels that their marriage
47
beginning.
the
from
struggle
a
but
been nothing
Zelda's psychiatrists tried to re-educate her into her role
as wife and mother.48 She said she would rather be a writer
than have a life with Scott. Zelda was diagnosed with an inferiority complex and released after fifteen months' confinement, only to be re-admitted later. "The psychiatrists declared her ambitions to be forms of self-deceptions, which had
deeply troubled their marriage. Over the years, despite
Zelda's pitiful requests for freedom, her obedient confessions
of self-blame, and her promises of 'good behavior,' the men
decided if and when she could spend 'vacations' outside the
asylum."49 Zelda died in a mental asylum fire before ever

regaining her freedom.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 7-9 (providing information from which this case study is
based).
47. CHESLER, supra note 43, at 9.
48. See id. at 8-9.
49. Id. at 13.
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Fortunately, the feminist movement has encouraged law
revision against discriminations based on gender and the revisions have, at least on occasion, applied to psychiatric
abuse. In Lenihan v. City of New York, 50 a federal district
court reviewed a discrimination claim filed by a female police
officer. Plaintiff, after being laid off, had participated in a
class action claim of sexual discrimination against her police
department. The action regained plaintiff her job and gained
female police officers substantial seniority and related benefits. In retaliation, plaintiff claimed, she was subjected to a
psychological evaluation in which she was found "below standard" principally because of her lack of self confidence. The
matter escalated and she was later sent to an internal Psychiatric Board which concluded that she was unfit, for psychiatric reasons, to serve in the Department.
A number of discrepancies, too numerous to recount
here, convinced the judge that the result was the product of
sex discrimination. He noted that there was a climate of hostility to women in the Department, that no one could recall
any other police officer ever having been referred for psychiatric review solely because of perceived deficiency of self confidence. While unprepared to reject psychiatric diagnoses, he
concluded that a substantial amount of it was "unhesitatingly" based on the accounts of a police captain whose views
he [found] to be affected in some significant measure by her
sex, and that they rendered their opinions to accommodate
their belief that she was unwelcome on the force. 51 Still hesitant to substitute his own views as to her mental condition,
he at least restrained the Department from discharging her
on the basis of the record they had compiled.
If Lenihan marks progress, it should be noted it does so
sparingly. In the end, doctors, whose motivations the judge
derided, had the last word. The possibility raised by their
findings prevented an order fully reinstating her and left it
open to the Department to make a record with fewer errors
on the basis of which they could, presumably, still discharge
her for behaving in a manner they did not approve.

50. 636 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51. See id. at 1014-15.
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The debate continues over the legitimacy of characterizing as illness conduct perceived to be inappropriate.5 2 In
1988, a divided United States Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue in a veterans' benefits case which turned significantly on whether alcoholism was willful misconduct as
opposed to a protected disability. Although the Court did not
have to decide whether or not alcoholism was a disease, the
majority opinion could not repress commenting approvingly
on the Court of Appeals' finding that there is "a substantial
body of medical literature that even contests ... that alcoholism is a disease."5 3
While all decisions which transform conduct into disease
raise prospects of political abuse, paranoia and its permutations are among those most likely to achieve suppression of
dissent, as Ezra Pound's case illustrates. When the act of
harboring complaints is the "illness" and when its severity
varies directly with the intensity of the complaints, one can
see that it is a perfect tool for political abuse. There is no
reliable data on how many people are involuntarily institutionalized because they stubbornly insist on what they consider the truth. 54 The author has represented several such
clients. One, Roy Schuster, had been incarcerated for twentyfive years in a mental institution when the author and another civil rights attorney undertook his case. His diagnosis
was paranoia. When questioned about the basis of the diagnosis, the attending psychiatrist testified that Mr. Schuster
had told the warden of his prison that there was corruption in
the prison and had refused to date to recant. 5 5 Another client
was held to be paranoid when he wrote his Congressman
complaining about the military assignment he had
56
received.
Not only are people placed involuntarily in mental institutions, many others are deprived of control over their wealth
52. The debate was popularly initiated by THOMAS S.

SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
(1961).
53. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (1988).
54. See Prisonerof Conscience, supra note 13 (sketching a Soviet case that
fits this description).
55. Trial Transcript, Herold v. Schuster, 396 U.S. 847 (1969) (No. 248) (on
file with author).
56. In re LCDR "C", unreported military "fitness" hearing (official summary
in author's files).
MENTAL ILLNESS
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by guardianship, 5 7 still others are "voluntarily" placed in in-

stitutions by their guardians who have not obtained their
consent, having accused them of mental imbalance.5 Many
who are not institutionalized are dehumanized by being labeled mentally ill.
The generic feature of an accusation of mental illness or
insanity is that it diverts attention from the accuser to the
accused. A dissenter's political message is drowned in his or
her alleged lunacy. The accused politician who charges his
attacker with being mentally ill, for example, escapes legal
notice while concern shifts to the ward's mental health. Failure to conform to common conduct is condemned as illness.
Some of the abuses result simply from the stigma attached to an accusation of lunacy. For them, defamation law
is the only legal remedy. The great bulk of abuses, however,
require the active participation of the state. For that reason,
they fall within the state's obligation to conform to agreed
upon human rights standards. When the state cynically uses
psychiatric institutions to stifle dissent, its violation is obvious. It is, however, also the state that inters mental patients
and uses its force to keep them in institutions at the behest of
security personnel or litigants, and so must be charged with
the impropriety of the parties if it exists.
It is the state
which divests allegedly incompetent persons of their control
of property, and so it must guard against enforcing private
schemes which use mental illness as an excuse for achieving
private ends. The state ultimately legitimates the definition
of normality and, so, is responsible when it adopts standards
which discriminate against the legitimate aspirations of women or persons with homosexual proclivities or otherwise enshrined conformity.
In short, the state must guard against using or endorsing
the use of the concept of mental illness as a means of achieving improper ends. It must do so whether the impropriety is
57. See generally LrVING WILL, supra note 42, at chs. 1-3.
58. Von Luce v. Rankin, 588 S.W.2d 445 (Ark. 1979); AMERICAN BAR
FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 260 (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971).
59. Cf. Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (developing this point with
respect to privately made racial covenants which it declared unconstitutional).
Since only the state is governed by the relevant constitutional principle, it
found "state action" inthe necessary enforcement which courts provided for the
private contracts and without which they would have no effect. Id.
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its own or that of a private party, if the state's authority is
invoked. In that regard, there is no country of which the author is aware that has met its minimal obligations to international human rights.
III.

REVIEW OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

To what extent do international guarantees of human
rights deal with such problems? As a beginning, one might
look to basic guarantees of human rights from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 60 This document sets forth the fundamental rights of all people which
are to be established and protected by the Member States.
The list is quite formidable. Pertinent to the problem of the
abuse of psychiatry and commitment to mental institutions
are the following Articles:
1. Article 3 provides that everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person.
2. Article 5 provides that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."
3. Article 8 requires that there be a "right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law."
4. Article 9 proscribes "arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile."
5. Article 10 provides that "[e]veryone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."
6. Article 12 protects a person's family, reputation and
honor from interference or attacks.
7. Article 18 ensures that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion . .. ."
8. Article 19 states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."
60. Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 18, at 71.
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All of these rights have been sacrificed for coercive psychiatric intervention in certain cases.
Since the Universal Declaration, the United Nations in
1975 adopted a Declaration of Rights of Disabled Persons
which includes the mentally ill. 6 It also adopted without
vote Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care on December 17,1991. The Principles are far better than other UN
work on the subject but it remains unclear what their effect
will be. In brief summary they provide:
Principle 1 adopts fundamental freedoms and basic
rights principally: best available medical care, protection
from exploitation and degradation as well as discrimination;
retention of political and civil rights and, most importantly,
legal representation to contest alleged incapacity, a fair hearing and the right to appeal and for periodic review of incapacity if it is found.
Principle 2 provides for special protection of minors, expressly recognizing the need to have a representative other
than a family member if necessary.
Principle 3 provides a mentally ill person the right to live
and work in the community to the extent possible.
Principle 4 provides that mental illness shall not be determined on the basis of status nor shall societal non-conformity be used as a factor; prior treatment or hospitalization
shall not justify present or future determination that a person is mentally ill; present classification of mental illness is
limited to purposes directly relating to mental illness. Unfortunately, it also uncritically adopts "internationally accepted
medical standards" suggesting that such standards exist and
can be found.
Principle 5 limits the right to force medical examination
to determine mental health.
Principle 6 requires confidentiality concerning those to
whom the principles apply.
Principle 7 states a preference for community based
treatment.
Principle 8 requires the same standard of social and medical care as is appropriate to other illnesses.
61. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess. (adopted Dec. 9,1975).
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Principle 9 requires that all treatment aim at preserving
personal autonomy, be individuated and least restrictive.
Principle 10 limits medication to that which is medicinally required.
Principle 11 provides elaborate informed consent
requirements.
Principle 12 provides for notice of rights.
Principle 13 provides for specific rights in mental health
facilities.
Principle 14 mandates a level of resources for mental
health facilities modeled on general health facilities.
Principle 15 provides that admissions procedures make
every effort to avoid involuntary admission and that voluntary patients be allowed to leave at will.
Principle 16 provides the conditions for involuntary admission and limits them to danger to self and others and
grave disability and requires that periods of such confinement be short.
Principle 17 provides for a review body and its
procedures.
Principle 18 provides for procedural due process
safeguards.
Principle 19 gives patients access to his or her records.
Principle 20 allows confinement of criminal offenders
who are mentally ill but requires the same level of treatment
as for others.
Principle 21 provides for a right to complain.
Principle 22 requires a state to monitor compliance.
Principle 23 says states should implement the Principles
and make them widely known.
Principle 24 applies the Principles to all who are admitted to mental institutions.
Principle 25 saves other rights not mentioned in the
Principles.
It is important to note that this document recognizes
mental health treatment and confinement as potentially
quite harmful and attempts to limit it unlike the case law
which generally treats both as presumptively beneficial and
socially acceptable.
Also instructive is the important European Convention
on Human Rights which prohibits torture and inhuman or
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degrading treatment or punishment.62 It also ensures liberty
and security of person. In addition Article 10 provides a right
to free expression; Article 9 prescribes the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; and Article 8 ensures the
right to respect for an individual's privacy and that of his
family. There have been many cases brought before the European Commission on Human Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights for the enforcement of the rights
guaranteed in the Convention. Whatever may be true of
their impact on persons not accused of mental illness, they do
not offer much hope to involuntary mental patients.
Begin by considering a case of confinement in a mental
institution as an alternative to prison-in itself quite common. In Y. v. United Kingdom, Y had been convicted by a
criminal court of numerous counts of fraud. 63 Under the applicable domestic law, a court may order a defendant to be
confined to a mental institution in lieu of prison if the circumstances warrant it. Y was examined by four psychiatrists
(two chosen by his solicitors) who agreed that Y was suffering
from paranoid schizophrenia. They disagreed, however, as to
the treatment required. The psychiatrists appointed by Y's
solicitors found that he should be confined to either a minimum security hospital or treated on an out-patient basis.
The Crown's psychiatrists found that he should be confined at
Broadmoor, a maximum security institution housing the insane. The domestic court ordered his incarceration in
Broadmoor.64
Before the Commission, Y attempted to obtain an order
transferring him to a lower security mental institution. He
alleged that Broadmoor was overcrowded, lacked privacy,
and had inadequate sanitary facilities. He further claimed
that he was not given treatment or even an explanation of
what treatment was necessary, and lacked fresh air and exercise. He also indicated that there were inadequate fire precautions and that he lived in constant fear, all in violation of
Article 3 of the Convention. He further complained of his
compulsory, indefinite detention in a mental hospital without
62. Collection of Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1-20 (1981).
63. Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6870/75, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 37, 37 (1979).
64. Id. at 38.
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periodic judicial review of the substantive justification for the
detention, citing Article 5 of the Convention.6
In evaluating his first claim; that the conditions at
Broadmoor were inhumane or degrading in violation of Article 3's protection of life, liberty and personal security, the
Commission concluded:
The ill treatment must attain a certain level of severity if
it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment
of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the cases such as the
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim.

66

The conditions at Broadmoor were thought to result primarily from overcrowding. The Commission acknowledged
that the Broadmoor facility was grossly overcrowded, but concluded that the applicant had a "tendency to exaggerate the
inadequacy of conditions in Broadmoor Hospital partly because of his uncooperative and negative attitude towards the
institution where he considered he should never have been
detained. '6 7 The Commission concluded on a vote of 8-5 that
there was no violation of Article 3.6
Note how comfortably the Commission indicated that his
claims could be disregarded because he was crazy. For a person not crazy, being negative about being institutionalized
would, presumably, be normal. The Commission also found
that there was a lack of sanitary facilities in all the dormitories, but again stated that "[iut appears that the applicant unduly and obsessively magnified his complaint concerning the
absence of toilet paper."6 9 Since he was crazy, he apparently
improperly missed toilet paper. As to his feeling that he
should never have been detained at Broadmoor, two of the
four psychiatrists agreed. Indeed, the question of whether his
mental state required involuntary confinement in such a
place was at issue but the Commission apparently thought
65. Id. at 39.
66. Y. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6870/75, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 37 (1979).
67. Id.
68. Dissenting opinions were filed by three members of the Commission.

Id.
69. Id.

19971

PSYCHIATRIC POLITICAL ABUSES

407

that issue foreclosed because his complaints were a product of
his mental state.
As to the violations of Article 5 which ensures freedom
from inhuman and degrading treatment, the Commission
found that since the applicant was committed to Broadmoor
by order of a competent court, no violation had occurred.7 °
They also concluded that the conditions at Broadmoor were
not as inhumane or degrading as Y indicated, based on their
determination that Y had a habit of exaggerating. The Commission did not even address Y's complaints that he did not
receive proper medical treatment and was not apprised of
which treatment was necessary, finding that there were good
grounds for concluding that the applicant was mentally ill.
They were persuaded of the merit of this diagnosis because
four psychiatrists concurred that Y suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia and two were appointed by the applicant's solicitors. Thus, they found it was not unreasonable for him to
be incarcerated in Broadmoor.
Perhaps the Commission missed the point. The value of
the diagnostic concurrence by the four psychiatrists is overshadowed by the fact that they had fundamentally different
opinions about Y's mental state, as demonstrated by their
disagreement concerning treatment."1 On that they were
evenly divided.
As to the charge that he did not receive psychiatric or
medical treatment, the Commission found that Y refused psychiatric treatment because he thought himself sane. Y stated
that he refused treatment because the need for it was not explained to him. The facts also reveal a dispute between the
applicant and his "Responsible Medical Officer." Due to the
dispute, the hospital claimed it was impossible to administer
any treatment to the applicant.
As a result, Y, who claimed he was sane, was locked in an
overcrowded maximum security facility. The state had abandoned attempting to treat him and excused his continued confinement on the basis of its claim that he was ill, which had
now become medically irrelevant. Discounting the allegations made by Y on the grounds of his alleged mental illness
reminds one of the folk wisdom related on many a bumper
sticker, "Just because you're paranoid don't mean they're not
70. Id.
71. See generally supra notes 20 and 21.
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out to get you." In United States jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has held mental health confinement in such circumstances unconstitutional at least when the "patient" was confined solely for his own welfare.7 2 It has also interdicted placing persons in a mental institution without a formal
commitment hearing.7 3
One example of a case involving political uses of psychiatry is that of X, a German lawyer charged with fraud.7 4 X, in
turn, accused his public prosecutor of plotting against him
and of intentionally bringing false charges. He sought to
have criminal charges brought against the prosecutor. In response, the prosecutor, relying on X's attempt at suicide nine
years earlier, obtained a court order to have X examined by a
psychiatrist. X refused to be examined, claiming he was not
mentally ill. X was then placed in a mental institution and
ultimately agreed to the examination as the only means of
obtaining his release.7 5 The court order and its implementation were before the Commission.
The Commission began by disposing of the applicant's
Article 3 claim, finding it manifestly ill-founded. The Commission concluded that it is a common procedure for a court
to request a psychiatric evaluation of a criminal defendant
and that such examination, of itself, cannot be considered degrading treatment.
The Commission next proceeded to the Article 876 contention that the evaluation impinged X's right to privacy. The
Commission acknowledged that the order for a psychiatric
evaluation does interfere with Article 8's prescriptions. However, Article 8 has broad exceptions if the infringement is
necessary in a democratic society. The Commission found the
order to be within the exception of Article 8(2) based on the
rationale that the Court acted within its rights in asking for
the evaluation: It was in the interests of both X and the
Court to be apprised of the defendant's mental condition.
The applicant also complained that the Court was not
justified in considering a police report unconnected with the
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
73. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1981).
74. X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No.83334/78, 24 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 103, 103 (1981).
75. He was examined, found fully criminally responsible and convicted of
fraud. Id.
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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present case. The Commission disagreed, citing Article 8(2).
It concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to examine the lawfulness of how it came to be apprised of the document and, once disclosed, the Court could not simply disregard it unless it were completely irrelevant.
The applicant's next complaint was that police retention
of the record of the attempted suicide was unjustified. The
Commission found that this was an issue of data protection
which is within the scope of Article 8, however, it found that
X had failed to exhaust his domestic remedies on this issue.
Therefore, X did not prevail on any issue.
It may well be true that X was incorrect in his claims
against the public prosecutor. Perhaps he was deluded. The
case is raised to demonstrate a potential political tactic which
seems immune from Commission review. The prosecutor was
able to shift the issue from the questionable legality his own
behavior to a question of his accuser's sanity. If the psychiatrist had corruptly or negligently found X insane, that would
have ended X's claim and probably resulted in X's incarceration (even if he was not guilty of a crime). A public officialespecially a prosecutor-would likely have easy access to a
court for such an order. Nothing in the Commission's response indicates that it is ready to assist in such
circumstances.
Another case which touches on some of the same issues is
X v. Norway.7 7 In this case, the applicant had served in the
Norwegian Foreign Ministry since 1963. Commencing in
1969, he felt that he was subject to surveillance by the intelligence services which exceeded normal security requirements.
In 1972, he was admitted to a mental hospital for a brief period. Thereafter, he was promoted to the rank of Division
Head with the Foreign Office. In 1973, the applicant filed a
complaint against some high ranking officials for persecuting
him, but no action was taken. A few weeks later, the applicant was forcibly confined to a mental hospital with the consent of his family. At the beginning of 1979, he was relieved
of his duties.
The applicant contended that his criticism of Norwegian
officials for subjecting him to surveillance directly resulted in
his being relieved of his duties. He claimed that this was in
77. X. v. Norway, App. No. 9401/81, 27 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 103,
103 (1981).
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violation of Article 10 of the Convention, 8 which protects the
right to free expression.
The Commission found the applicant's petition to be
without merit. It determined that there was no evidence to
suggest that the applicant was hindered in his right to free
expression since he, in fact, publicly denounced the conduct of
the high officials. How nice for them that he had been
branded a lunatic.
The Commission also gave weight to the Norwegian authorities' denial that applicant was subject to surveillance
and their assertion that he imagined it. Additionally, the
Commission found that applicant's feelings of persecution detracted from his ability to do his job. Also, the Commission
deferred to the judgment of the Norwegian officials that the
applicant's behavior diminished the prestige and credibility
of his division. Due to these considerations, the Commission
found that applicant's transfer to another job at the same salary did not violate domestic law or the Convention. It therefore concluded that the application was ill-founded.
But could he have been rational and telling the truth?
Psychiatrists are trained to treat patients based on their account of events to the physician. Nothing in their training
makes them able to evaluate the truth of the account as opposed to its reflection on the patient's mental health. They
are not supposed to investigate for truth and do not. One of
the most curious anomalies concerning forensic use of psychiatry is that it uses people with such training to testify to the
truth of their patient's accounts!
Once a person is incarcerated or found incompetent, the
possibility of involuntary drugging often follows, making
resistance difficult. In X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 the Commission considered the application of the
Convention to the forced administration of medicine to patients confined in a mental hospital. In 1971, X was convicted
of indecent assault and sentenced to two years imprisonment.
He was found to be of diminished capacity and ordered confined to a psychiatric hospital under domestic law. In 1973,
the Court reviewed the applicant's condition and found him
to be dangerous. The Court also appointed a guardian for X,
78. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
79. X v. The Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 8518/79, 20 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193, 193 (1980).
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charged with the duty to administer his property and to authorize medical treatment for him.
X complained that the drugs Psychopharmaca and
Neuroleptica had been administered with the consent of his
guardian but against his will. He complained that forced administration of the medication violated both Articles 380 and
8.81 As to Article 3, the Commission concluded that forced
medication was not inhumane or degrading treatment. They
deferred to the judgment of the physicians and the guardian
and found that it was in X's best interests to be medicated by
force.
They next considered the Article 8 charge. Article 8 ensures the right to a private life. The Commission found that
when a person is placed under guardianship, it interferes
with his right to privacy but also found that the appointment
of a guardian was authorized by domestic law. It relied on
the exception to Article 8 for prevention of disorder or crime,
finding that when the applicant failed to take proper medication, he threatened other patients and wardens with murder.
It therefore found no violation of Article 8.
In none of the cases mentioned was psychiatry obviously
used simply to suppress dissent, although psychiatry has
been used overtly to accomplish political suppression, as has
been noted. It is important to observe that the defenses
available are inadequate to guard against more cynical
abuses and, of course, to realize that the denial of human
rights may occur even when there are no darker motives.
Also, it must be admitted that there has been limited
protection in some cases against the most egregious types of
governmental conduct. One example is a case involving the
recall, without notice, of a former mental patient. In X. v.
United Kingdom, 2 X had been confined to Broadmoor Hospital after he had been convicted of a violent assault. He was
subsequently released by the Secretary of State for the Home
Office on a conditional basis. The conditions of his release
were that he should live at a specified address with his wife,
that he should be under the supervision of a probation officer
and that he should attend a psychiatric out-patient clinic.
80. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6998/75, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 106, 106 (1977).
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However, the Secretary of State for the Home Office retained
the power to recall him to Broadmoor.
X lived with his wife and secured a job. After three
years, he was arrested by the police and returned to
Broadmoor Hospital but was not informed of the reason for
his return. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus. At the
hearing of the writ, three of X's co-workers testified that
there was nothing unusual about his behavior. His general
practitioner also testified that there was no cause for concern.
However, the Court rejected the writ and deferred to the
analysis of a probation officer.
The applicant contended that his detention at Broadmoor
violated Article 3,83 5(1)(c), 4 5(2)85 and 5(3).' 6 The Commission held that the charge as to Article 3 was inadmissible.
Once the proceeding commenced, the United Kingdom came
forward with information as to why X had been recalled to
Broadmoor. X's wife stated that her previous assurances that
X was making good progress were untrue. She further complained that he was deluded and threatening, and that she
was afraid of him.
Article 5(1)(a) prohibits the detention of a person unless
his detention is ordered by a competent court. The Government contended that since X was only conditionally released
from Broadmoor, his detention had been ordered by a competent court. X maintained that this section did not apply to his
case.
Article 5(1)(e) prohibits detention unless the detention is
required to prevent the spreading of infectious diseases, or for
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts or vagrants. The applicant claimed that no effort had been made
to check his state of mind.87
Article 5(2) requires that those detained be informed of
the charges against them, however, the Government asserted
that this section was inapplicable to cases involving section
5(1)(e).88 The applicant contended that the vague and general reasons for his recall were insufficient under section 5(2).
83. See supra note 60 and
84. See supra note 60 and
85. See supra note 60 and
86. See supra note 60 and
87. X. v. United Kingdom,
Rep. 106, 106 (1977).
88. Id.

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
App. No. 6998/75, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
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The Commission found that the application may have merit
and found it admissible. In its report of July 16, 1980 it
found:
By 14 votes to 2, that X's recall to Broadmoor Hospital
and further detention there had not violated his rights
under article 5, paragraph 1;
Unanimously, that there had been a breach of article 5,
paragraph 2, in that X [had not been] given prompt and
sufficient reasons for his arrest and readmission to
Broadmoor;
Unanimously, that article 5, paragraph 4 had been violated, since X had not been entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention consequent upon his
recall to hospital could be decided speedily by a court. s9
The Commission requested that the European Court of
Human Rights determine whether the "applicant was a victim of a violation of article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Convention when he was recalled to Broadmoor Hospital on 5
April 1974 and whether thereafter the applicant was entitled
to and received an adequate judicial determination of the
lawfulness of this renewed detention in accordance with article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention."9 0
The Court first disposed of the issue of whether Articles
5(1)(a) and (5)(1)(e) were applicable. It found that X had been
convicted by a competent court within the meaning of Article
5. It therefore found that paragraph 1(a) applied. Since he
was committed to Broadmoor, the Court indicated, subparagraph (e), in so far as it related to the detention of 'persons of
unsound mind', also applied."9 1 The Court placed particular
reliance on the fact that X was conditionally released from
Broadmoor and had enjoyed a lengthy period of liberty. It
found no breach of article 5, paragraph 1.
As to Article 5, paragraph 4, the applicant had alleged
that there was no opportunity to determine judicially the lawfulness of his detention in Broadmoor. The Court found that
89. U.N.

SUB-COMM'N ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION

OF MINORITIES, PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION
OF PERSONS DETAINED ON GROUNDS OF MENTAL ILL-HEALTH OR SUFFERING FROM

MENTAL DISORDER at

E.85.XIV.9 (1986).
90. Id. at 93.
91. Id. at 97.

33, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/1983/17/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
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the recall decision by the Home Secretary was based, at least
in part, on considerations different from those pertaining to
the original confinement order. Further, though the medical
condition of a conditionally released patient might change
with the passage of time, no provision had been made for periodic review. Therefore, the Court found a breach of Article
5, paragraph 4.
The Court next addressed whether the United Kingdom
violated Article 5, paragraph 2 by failing to inform X of the
reasons for his recall to the hospital. The Government asked
the Court to look to its new procedure with regard to recalling
patients to mental hospitals. They conceded that the old procedure did not comport with Article 5. Changes had been
made because of the criticisms made by the European Human
Rights Commission.
The Court found that "it was clear from the evidence that
lack of information as to the specific reasons for the recall, a
matter almost exclusively within the knowledge of the Home
Secretary, prevented X's counsel, and thus the Divisional
Court, from [deciding the original habeas petition]." 92 Since

the Court had already found a violation of Article 5, paragraph 4 and the Government had rectified the problems with
its procedure, it did not decide the issue.
In Van Der Leer v. The Netherlands Nationwide Life Insurance Co. 93 the Court of Justice determined that the con-

version of a voluntary commitment into involuntary status
without notice or hearing violated Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(4)
by confining her without the hearing required by national law
to inform her of the reasons for her new status and in failing
to resolve the matter speedily. While the case does stand for
some due process requirement in involuntary commitment, it
should be noted that several procedures under national law
which allowed a hearingless detention were not invoked and
the court merely noted the absence of the justification they
would provide. The court did, however, equate the confinement with criminal arrest holding that the "arrest" provision
in Article 5(2) was breached.

92. Id.
93. Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, App. No. 11509/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
567, 567 (1990).
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In E v. Norway9 4 the Human Rights Court also invoked
Article 5(4) to condemn the tardy review of a detention
although they held that the Norwegian Courts were free to
hold a person in administrative custody for being "someone
with an underdeveloped or permanently impaired mental capacity" creating a danger of recidivism. 95 There was also
some doubt that review procedures really permitted national
courts to release the prisoner should they find the administrative detention improper: Nonetheless, the court gave the
state process the benefit of the doubt and denied that aspect
of the Article 5(4) claim.
In App. No. 12535 /86 v. Netherlands9 6 the Commission
held that it retained jurisdiction in a case which had
progressed through its preliminary examination even though
the patient who had filed it had since been released.
97
On the other hand, consider Keus v. Netherlands.
There a prisoner who, under Dutch law, could be sentenced to
two year periods of detention at "the Government's disposal"
in a mental institution following a penal sentence escaped on
the eve of a hearing to determine whether he should be so
detained. The government did not notify him for the good
reason that it could not find him. It also did not notify his
lawyer whom they could find. The result was that, when
shortly thereafter he was returned to custody, he had no authorized court procedure in which to litigate the need for his
confinement. By a five to four vote, the Court of Human
Rights found no violation of the hearing provision of Article
5(4). They agreed that the absence of a court hearing was a
violation of 5(4) but, precisely for that reason, found that he
had a remedy. Since the Netherlands was bound by Article
5(4) and "the fundamental adversarial principle" he could
have claimed a hearing on the appropriateness of his immediate release without such a hearing being preestablished by
98
law.

94. E. v. Norway, App. No. 11701/85, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, 30 (1990).
95. Id.
96. App. No. 12535/86 v. Netherlands, App. No. 12535/86, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep.
46, 102 (1986).
97. Keus v. Netherlands, App. No. 12228/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 700, 700
(1990).

98. Id. at

28.
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A study of some of these and other cases was made by
Professor Dinah Shelton and Dr. Thomais Douraki.9 9 From a
review of the cases just discussed as well as from a reading of
the Shelton-Douraki paper one is led to the conclusion that
mental patients are rapidly receiving basic due process in Europe. Unfortunately, as I have written before, due process
works to illuminate identified issues but helps little when the
basic issue is itself muddled. 10 0 The European Court of
Human Rights in the Winterwerp decision' 01 realized that
the convention language for mental illness, a person of unsound mind, is not a term which can be given a definite interpretation. With a glimpse of the problem, the court concluded
that unsound mind cannot be premised on views or behaviors
which deviate from the norms of a particular society. To
demonstrate that it did not get the point, the court added
that the "true" mental disorder should be of a "kind or degree
warranting compulsory confinement. " 10 2 The SheltonDouraki study similarly concludes conventionally by noting,
"[i]t must be considered that often mental patients have disabilities which deprive them of the ability to adequately communicate information necessary or relevant to protect their
human rights."'0 3
It is a short step from stating that those accused of
mental illness are sometimes too disabled to communicate to
"protecting" them by the confinement that the court finds the
final test of the legitimacy of the diagnosis. To look at the
accusation of mental illness as an indication of reasons to disregard the claims of the accused is to fall into the trap that
forensic psychiatry has always set. Since forensic psychiatric
testimony, as opposed to psychiatric diagnoses for treatment
purposes, almost always turns on predictions, postdictions or
statusdictions of behavior, they overlap usual judicial functions. When they are allowed to determine the issue, they

99. Dinah Shelton & Thomas Douraki, Human Rights and the Mentally Ill
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
100. George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on
Guardianshipfor the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (1979) [hereinafter Alexander, Premature Probate].
101. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A no. 33) at 387 (1979).
102. Id. at 39.
103. Shelton & Douraki, supra note 99, at 20.
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usurp those functions. All the evidence we have10 suggests
4
that the testimony is as often wrong as it is right.
As an example, consider Nielsen v. Denmark.1 0 5 In that
case a mother committed her minor child to a psychiatric
ward of a state hospital in her role as his custodian. The
child complained that he did not require medical treatment
but was placed solely to deny custody to his father. He
pointed out that he had had no hearing to challenge his confinement. On the facts the Commission had found a violation
of Article 5(1) and Article 5(4) but the Court of Human Rights
disagreed. It was satisfied that the mother, when taking the
decision to commit the child to the hospital, had as her objective the protection of applicant's health. Hospitalization was
decided in accordance with expert medical advice, and the
child was not treated as being of unsound mind nor put in a
ward with psychotic children. His mother's action was
viewed as acting in his interests so there was no need of a
hearing to consider the child's view. Four judges dissented.
The circumstances fit the non-definition of mental illness perfectly. The majority could concern itself with the inability of
the child to communicate his needs or note that the diagnosis
had led to forced confinement. The Shelton-Douraki paper
10 6
treats the case as illustrating the need for child protection.
I think it illustrates the error of reliance on psychiatric advice and any substitute for adversary hearing when incarcerating people.
IV.

A

UNITED NATIONS PROPOSAL FOR THE PREVENTION OF

PSYCHIATRIC USURPATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

CONCERNS

In 1986, in a commendable recognition of the issues, the
United Nations commissioned a study of the problems of persons detained on the basis of mental illness to formulate
guidelines for domestic law which would protect the rights of
these detainees. The Guidelines are only advisory. They are
quite comprehensive in scope, undoubtedly well intentioned
and a substantial advance over existing practice. They none104. For my latest summary of this problem together with a citation of relevant authorities see George J. Alexander, Big Mother: The State's Use of
Mental Health Experts in Dependency Cases, 24 PAc. L.J. 1465 (1993).
105. 144 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1988).

106. Shelton & Douraki, supra note 99, at 16.
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take what is artheless ignore some important problems and
10 7
guably a wrongheaded approach to others.
The Guidelines begin by prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
national or social origin, property, birth or other staopinion,
10 8
tus.

In addition, they indicate that previous detention in a

mental hospital may not justify discrimination against the
former patient.
The Guidelines then provide that all other fundamental
freedoms guaranteed are to be accorded mentally ill persons.
The Guidelines provide the following guarantees in addition
to the fundamental freedoms:
1. A definite time period for detention.
2. A diagnosis of mental ill-health must be determined in accordance with internationally accepted medical standards.
This statement assumes a far greater agreement among psychiatrists than exists. The failure to agree, that is the failure
of reliability, is one of the problems which has plagued
psychiatry. 109

3. Difficulties in adapting to particular moral, social,
cultural, or political values may not be a determining factor in finding mental illness.
This is a pious statement worthy of consideration. Unfortunately, mental abnormality requires a base line normality for
comparison. Failure to adapt to accepted values will likely be
medicalized to mental illness irrespective of this directive.
Consider whether Joan of Arc could hope to win a trial of her
sanity. Jesus Christ? Mahatma Ghandi?
4. Every patient shall be treated in a communitybased facility to the extent possible.
This is an excellent requirement. It had a good following in
the United States in the prior decade. Unfortunately, it
amounted mostly to ending state support: The communities
did not respond to help even those wanting help. 110
107. PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES AND GUARANTEES, supra note 89.
108. Id. at art. 2, 1.
109. See supra note 20.
110. See ANDREW T. SCULL, DECARCERATION (1977); HOLLY S. WILSON, DEINSTITUTIONALIZED RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISORDERED (1982);
Matt Clark et. al., The New Snake Pits, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1978, at 93.
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5. Every patient has the legal right to receive social
and medical services to protect him from harm.
This provision must be read together with the twelfth provision which bars unwanted treatment. Great care must be
taken to see that the right to receive services is not transmuted to the duty to be "served."
6. Mental institutions must be inspected monthly by
a higher competent authority.
7. Mental institutions may only accept qualified patients who a competent court would determine require
institutionalization.
This provision represents a substantial advance over practice. Not only does it require a preadmission procedure, it rejects a medical, as opposed to a legal determination.1 1 1
8. Patients have the right to the least restrictive
alternative.
This is an extremely useful1 12norm. It has some domestic support in the United States.
9. Psychosurgery and electroconvulsive treatment
may never be applied without the patient's consent or the
consent of his/her legal representative.

This, also, has great merit given the disrepute of both treatrule has been adopted in some states
ment forms. A similar
1 13
States.
United
of the
10. Psychiatric knowledge shall be used only for diagnosis, therapy and treatment of the patient and shall
never be abused for non-medical purposes.
So long as psychiatric knowledge is used to impose treatment,
this provision is confusing. Imposition of confinement and
compelling treatment (as opposed to the treatment itself)
would seem, after all, to be state police power purposes, not
medical purposes.
11. Medication shall be given only for therapeutic
purpose and shall not be used as punishment.
111. Cf. Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Neb. 1975).
112. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
113. Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients'Right
to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978); Note, Regulation of Electro
Convulsive Therapy, 75 MICH. L. REV. 363 (1976).
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Although this provision outlaws chemical torture, it misses
the problem of the use of sedation and tranquilization as responses to opposition. Both are usually seen as therapeutic.
12. Every patient has the right to refuse treatment.
An excellent point. It does not, however, take care of releasing those who cannot be helped by institutionalization because they refuse treatment. 114 Put another way, institutionalization itself is a form of treatment which every "patient"
should be allowed to refuse if it is imposed for his or her alleged benefit. Also, it should be clear that this requirement
cannot be overridden by the simple expedient of finding the
patient incompetent to refuse treatment. Advance directives
have utility for this purpose." 5
13. Every hospital patient has the right to communicate with people outside the institution.
14. Patients have the unrestricted right to receive
and send uncensored communications from and to his/her
lawyer, guardian or other legal representative or his/her
family or friends.
15. Hospital patients also have the right to receive
visitors regularly.
16. Hospital patients also have the following rights:
a. to practice his/her religion
b. to privacy
c. to enjoy facilities for education and training
d. to enjoy facilities for reading, recreation and
sport
e. to purchase essential items for daily living
It is difficult to believe that these rights will not be eroded by
transforming their exercise to manifestations of illness. Suppose, for example, a person whose religious perspective includes direct communication with God. Will psychiatrists be
prohibited from attempting to cure that belief?
17. Any patient who has not been declared incapable
(incompetent?) shall not be treated as such because he/she
has been admitted to a mental institution.
114. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
115. Using advance directives, persons, while they are competent, can appoint an agent to carry out their wishes should they become incompetent. Unlike their contemporaneous demands when they become incompetent, their
prior written directions are legally binding. See generally LIVING WILL, supra
note 42.
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This is a good provision. United States' experience indicates,
however, that a finding of incompetence will follow
1 16
admission.
18. Every patient not declared incapable has the
right to exercise his/her civil, political, social or cultural
rights, including the right to manage his/her own financial affairs.
19. Forced labor in mental institutions is prohibited.
Again, one must guard against forced labor being termed
1 17
therapy.
20. Every patient shall have the right to a qualified
guardian to protect his/her well-being and interests.
This norm expresses a view of guardianship as beneficial.
Too often, unfortunately, guardianship is the principal
method of depriving the patient of his rights.1 1 The provision should at least include the right to choose the surrogate.
Again, advance directives would be helpful to insure that the
choice would be accepted.
For a person voluntarily admitting him/herself to a
mental institution, the Guidelines provide the following
rules:
1. Medical standard for admission:
a. two medical practitioners must concur, after a
proper personal examination, that the patient is
suffering from a mental illness and is likely to
benefit from admission.
b. the patient has been informed of the purpose of
the admission.
c. the patient requests, consents or does not object
to admission.
2. Every voluntary patient has the right to leave the
mental institution at anytime, unless he/she could be admitted as an involuntary patient.
This is the type of provision which makes supposedly voluntary admission truly involuntary. A patient is informed that
if he or she does not consent to treatment, an involuntary admission will follow.1 19 The rule should be that a voluntary
H. D. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE
(1971).
117. See Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wisc. 1974).
118. See, Alexander, PrematureProbate, supra note 100.
119. RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
INAL AsPEcTs 270, 271 (1985).
116. GEORGE J.ALEXANDER & TRAVIS
FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 135, 136

NEED

CRIM-
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patient may always leave at will. It should be improper to
use the threat of involuntary admission to keep a voluntary
patient. Only by putting some barriers between the two can
the state encourage patients to seek self help without fear of
being enmeshed in a more coercive system than they seek.
For a person being committed involuntarily, the Guidelines provide the following rules:
1. Medical standard:
a. Two medical practitioners must concur that admission for care and treatment because the patient is suffering from severe mental illness or
mental disorder and is a danger to himself or
others or the community.
This provision adopts the common notion that involuntary
hospitalization is justified with which there is sharp disagreement. 120 It attempts to build in some safeguards against
excessive confinement but they lack teeth. The insane are
usually perceived as dangerous. Some objective evidence of
danger should, at least, be required, such as recent dangerous conduct. 12 1 Advance directives should allow a competent
person to reject future "benefit" by incarceration premised on
either the person's best interests or because of danger to
self' 2 2 if the state insists on disregarding contemporaneous
rejection of confinement on competency grounds.
b. A competent court must order the commitment.
The court must afford the patient appropriate
preparation and give him/her a proper hearing
in the case.
One cannot quarrel with the spirit of this provision. Unfortunately, mental health issues are more difficult to determine
1 23
than most issues faced by courts.
2. A notice must be given in advance of the judicial
hearing and must be required by law.
3. The notice must be in a language which the patient understands and must contain the time and place of
the hearing, the name and address of the lawyer who will
120. BRUCE J. Ennis, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); SZASZ, LAW AND LIBERTY, supra note 25; Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case
Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV.
54 (1982) [hereinafter Morse].
121. REISNER, supra note 119, at 353 n.3.
122. LIVING WILL, supra note 42, at 76, 77.
123. See Alexander, PrematureProbate, supra note 100.
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represent the patient, the legal and medical standards for
committal, the legal rights which the patient has prior to
the hearing, the grounds and specific facts that are alleged to justify commitment and the names of the persons
who will testify at the hearing.
4. The patient has the following rights in the proceedings before the Court:
a. to be represented by a "trained lawyer and experienced advocate"
b. to be heard personally
c. to attend and participate at the hearing; this
right may only be abrogated if the patient's behavior will disrupt the proceedings.
12 4
The exception is unwise. It is likely to overwhelm the rule.
As in criminal cases, presence is some guarantee of fairness.
Cases in which the patient/defendant is removed from court
should be truly exceptional.
d. to see all relevant documents submitted to the
court
e. to call an independent expert witness
f. to compel the presence of witnesses.
5. The court must make its findings in writing, stating the reasons for its decision.
6. There must be judicial review of the lower court's
decision which may be initiated by any interested person.
Does this provide an antagonist a second opportunity to incarcerate? It should not do so, especially if the person seeking review has no psychiatric expertise.
7. The commitment decision must be reviewed at intervals specified by the Court.
In criminal proceedings it is provided that:
1. A suspected, accused, convicted or detained person
shall have the right to an independent psychiatric examination and report whenever his/her mental condition is
relevant to legal proceedings.
2. Neither criminal charges nor criminal conviction
shall be a sufficient reason for varying the procedures and
124. In several studies in the United States rules requiring the presence of
the allegedly incompetent person have been mostly disregarded even with
stricter language. Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law
of Conservatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 273 (1988); Peter Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae,40 Mo.

L. REv. 215, 235 n.81 (1975).
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standards for determining the presence or absence of
mental illness.
3. If there is a serious reason to suspect that an accused patient is not fit to stand trial because of severe
mental illness, the Court shall inquire into the question, if
necessary upon its own authority.
While the provision is to be commended for involving the
court in the resolution of issues raised by those "unfit to stand
trial," the unfitness notion raises the threat of allowing the
state to keep an innocent person from exonerating him/herself. Further safeguards are required to prevent abuse.
4. A person shall not be held criminally responsible
by reason of severe mental illness he/she was unable to
control or criminal impulses he/she was unable to restrain
or if he/she was unable to appreciate the criminal nature
of his/her acts.
There is reason to doubt that the criminal procedure rules are
as humanitarian as they seem. The insanity defense appears
to be rarely successful in jurisdictions where it is accepted
doctrine. 12 5 It often leads to a period of greater incarceration
also
than conviction. 12 6 The notion of legal irresponsibility
12 7
leads to many of the abuses in the civil system.
5. A condition of mental illness which does not fully
eliminate criminal responsibility should be considered as
diminishing responsibility and should be taken into consideration by the court in determining the sentence. The
same concerns expressed about the prior norm apply here.
6. A patient who is acquitted because of failure to establish a material element of the offense should be admitted to a mental institution only as a voluntary patient, or
following a involuntary commitment by order of a competent court.
At a minimum, there would not be a longer period of involuntary treatment following such acquittal, based on the conduct

125. The insanity defense is raised in fewer than 2% of criminal cases in the
United States. It is rarely successful in a contested jury trial. REISNER, supra
note 119, at 562 n.1.
126. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
127. See Thomas Szasz & George J. Alexander, Mental Illness as an Excuse
for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 24 (1967), reprinted in 147 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISORDERS 113 (1968).
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which lead to the trial,128than the period of incarceration authorized for the crime.

7. If a person is acquitted because of lack of criminal
responsibility due to severe mental illness, but material
facts of the crimes were otherwise proven, if he/she is
amenable to care and treatment, the court may order
either community-based treatment or, if the commitment
standards are met, treatment in a mental institution.
The limitations suggested for the prior provision apply here
as well.
8. A convicted person confined to a mental institution
shall be provided with adequate mental care and
treatment.
9. At the end of his/her sentence, a patient shall be
released and shall not be admitted to or retained in a
mental institution as an involuntary patient unless the
commitment standards are met.
The limitations suggested for the sixth point apply here as
well.
As inadequate to the problems as the Guidelines are,
they represent commendable recognition that serious
problems lurk behind psychiatric "treatment" decisions. Unfortunately, they are not mandatory. Nonetheless, human
rights advocates should incorporate their teachings and suggested improvements into their claims to begin the process of
establishing them as customary law.
V.

CONCLUSION

The coercive use of psychiatry represents a violation of
basic human rights in all cultures. Some specific violations
are, obviously, more blatant than other. The main concern
that must be expressed is that many of the abuses are
masked as humanitarian gestures and that society has stereotyped people it calls lunatics in a far more effective way than
most racial or ethnic minorities.
It is well beyond the scope of this article to address ways
in which one might make substitutions for current practices.
128. See Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). This provision should not
be limited to the greatest potential criminal sentence but should incorporate
opportunities for earlier release, such as by parole, in the same manner as in
criminal cases. United States ex. rel. Schuster v. Herrold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2nd
Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
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Evaluating alternatives against present perceived problems
is a daunting task. It has, of course, been partially under-

12 9
taken by some scholars.

At the moment, there is little resistance to even the most
Machiavellian use of psychiatry. It is hoped that, by drawing
attention to the problem, some support for a more determined
attack on this form of rights abuse will be mustered, and that
skepticism of the medical aura that surrounds the treatment
of persons labeled mentally ill will be stirred. Few groups of
psychiatrists these days are likely to join organizations such
as the Nazi Realm's Work Committee of Institutions for Cure
and Care, and cure and care will usually not be shorthand for
administered killing. But will "cure and care" always be benevolent or will it sometimes be dissent opinions that are
cured and dissidents taken care of in the sense of American
gangster movies? In any event, can there be an effective system of international human rights if it does not guard against
such possibilities?

129. See ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 116; SzAsz, LAW
supra note 25; Morse, supra note 120.

AND LIBERTY,

